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I.

Introduction: 2016
The election of Donald J. Trump to the presidency of the United States marks a

key shift in the state of national politics. For rightwing enthusiasts, his election represents
a triumph over rampant political correctness and the elitist political establishment of
Washington, DC. For leftwing opponents, it signifies the disturbing normalization of a
fascist discourse at the highest level of mainstream politics. In the aftermath of perhaps
one of the most contentious elections in US history, those on the left side of the aisle find
themselves counting their losses and evaluating the stakes of their defeat, desperately
sifting through the slew of pledges amassed during Trump’s lengthy seventeen-month
campaign. Some of the centerpieces of Trump’s campaign to “Make America Great
Again” that launched the president-elect into political stardom among persuaded
Americans included the deportation of eleven million undocumented immigrants to
Mexico, the construction of a wall spanning the entire length of the US-Mexico border,
the temporary ban of Muslims from entering the country, and the federal defunding of
Planned Parenthood. Conversely, his polarizing platform touched a nerve among
minorities across the spectrum and their political supporters, serving to rally those
disenchanted voters against his divisive message.
As a Republican presidential candidate, Trump made a historical appeal to the
LGBTQ electorate. Despite his concerted efforts to court the LGBTQ vote, data collected
from exit polls reveals that LGBTQ voters were the only major demographic whose
opposition to the Republican candidate in 2016 has actually increased since the re-
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election of Barack Obama in 2012.1 To be fair, it is no surprise that proponents of
LGBTQ rights failed to turn out in droves in favor of a Trump presidency. They protested
his vice-presidential pick, Mike Pence—the Indiana governor notorious for opposing
same-sex marriage, advancing “religious liberty” legislation that would sanction
discrimination against LGBTQ folks, and promoting conversion therapy for LGBTQ
minors throughout his state. Furthermore, there was deep worry over the possibility of
Trump appointing Supreme Court justices who would attempt to gut same-sex marriage.
Without delegitimizing the threat that these factors pose to mainstream LGBTQ politics, I
focus my attention on the more unusual “pro-LGBTQ” efforts that defined key moments
of Trump’s campaign.
Just days before the election in November, Trump was seen parading a rainbow
flag on stage at a Colorado campaign rally. However, it was in July 2016 during the
Republican National Convention that Trump’s apparently “pro-gay” position became
definitively grounded in his campaign platform. Peter Thiel—billionaire tech investor,
founder of PayPal, and openly gay man—spoke out in support of Trump, proclaiming, “I
am proud to be gay. I am proud of be a Republican. But most of all I am proud to be an
American,” signaling the first time an openly gay person has taken the stage at the
Convention.2 When Trump himself came around to the podium on the final night of the
Convention, he made a startling appeal to the LGBTQ community. Highlighting the
“Islamic terrorist” attack at Pulse nightclub in Orlando on June 12, 2016, Trump stated,
“As your President, I will do everything in my power to protect LGBTQ citizens from the

1

"LGBT Voters Came out Strong for Hillary, Dumped Trump in Historic
Numbers." AMERICAblog News. N.p., 15 Nov. 2016. Web.
2
"Why Peter Thiel's Speech at the GOP Convention Matters." Time. Time, n.d. Web.
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violence and oppression of a hateful foreign ideology.”3 As a lesbian viewing the
broadcast in real time, I was speechless; not only was his message a stark departure from
the explicitly anti-gay platform that the Republican Party has embraced for years,4 but it
also signaled Trump’s attempt to pit LGBTQ folks against Muslims (falsely assuming the
mutual exclusivity of the two groups). To top it all off, the Republican-packed arena
frantically cheered and chanted “USA” in response to Trump’s promise to protect
LGBTQ citizens from Islamic terrorism, to which Trump himself expressed
astonishment.5 These bizarre moments in present-day American politics have left me
desperately searching for answers: what ideological objective is served by Trump’s
promotion of the LGBTQ community as a class of citizens, worthy of protection from
Islamic terrorism? What events in recent history might explain this significant shift in
Republican campaign strategy towards a favorable (if only rhetorically) treatment of the
LGBTQ community?
The answer, as I will argue throughout this paper, has much to do with same-sex
marriage and the US nation-building project. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court
publicly announced its landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 6 effectively legalizing
same-sex marriage throughout the US. Aside from offering state-sanctioned marriage and
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Donald J. Trump/G4ViralVideos. “Donald Trump Promises to Protect the LGBTQ
Community.” Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 22 July 2016. Web. 26 September
2016.
4
See GOP’s 2016 platform: "The 2016 Republican Party Platform." GOP. N.p., 18 July 2016.
Web.
5
In response to the crowd’s cheers, Trump states, “And I have to say, as a Republican it is so nice
to hear you cheering for what I just said. Thank you.” Donald J. Trump/G4ViralVideos.
“Donald Trump Promises to Protect the LGBTQ Community.” Online video clip.
YouTube. Youtube, 22 July 2016. Web. 26 September 2016.
6
See Obergefell v. Hodges. United States Supreme Court. 26 June 2015. Print.

4

its material benefits7 to same-sex couples across the nation for the first time, the ruling
created new inroads for certain groups of queer folks8 in accessing full-fledged
citizenship and partaking in the nation-building project. Utilizing the mass shooting at
Pulse nightclub and its aftermath as temporal indicators of shifting political attitudes
around LGBTQ rights, I argue that since Obergefell, the respectability9 newly available
to queer folks (specifically those who participate or aspire to participate in traditional
marriage and family-building) is responsible for creating a new class of “good queers”
worthy of protection from “bad Muslims.” In other words, beyond enabling certain queer
folks to reap the legal and social benefits afforded to “good citizens,” the legalization of
same-sex marriage has also assisted in reifying a new strategic incentive for the
continuation of the War on Terror: that is the state’s investment in protecting its good

7

The material benefits and responsibilities afforded to married couples by the government
include “taxation; inheritance and property rights, rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege
in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decision making authority; adoption rights; the
rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional and ethics rules,
campaign finance restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child
custody, support and visitation rules.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
8
The term “queer” has been the subject of extensive debate both within and outside lesbian, gay
bisexual, transgender, queer (LGBTQ) communities and their respective discourses. I do not
simply reject the critical negotiations over this term that such scholars like Cathy J. Cohen have
engaged in, including her extension of the term “queer” to apply to certain racialized heterosexual
individuals; rather, in acknowledgment of the rhetorical limitations within the discourse of
sexuality, I assert my usage of “queer” throughout this paper as a means of capturing all folks
whose sexualities reside outside of conventional understandings of heterosexual conduct (that is
sex between two cisgender individuals of the opposite sex), as opposed to the commonly
deployed lesbian, gay, bisexual (LGB) classification, which inherently excludes two larger
groups: 1) those individuals who engage in non-heterosexual sex who reject assigning themselves
to the above-mentioned LGB categories, and 2) trans individuals who engage in heterosexual sex
but whose trans identity may forbid the state’s recognition of it as such.
9
Throughout this paper I utilize the term “respectability” to describe the state’s attitude towards
queer folks whose aspirations and life choices adhere to its idea of proper citizenship
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queers from “Islamic terrorism” and, more specifically, those bad Muslims who aspire to
kill them.10
Throughout this paper, I will grapple with the major debates that have dominated
the discourse around same-sex marriage—utilizing the conservative view offered in
Lawrence v. Texas,11 the liberal view in Obergefell, and foundational leftist anti-marriage
theories as the primary objects of my analysis—and give weight to the ways in which the
state’s administration of social and legal rewards (as made available through the
institution of marriage) has necessarily been shaped by its preferences for whiteness and
the traditional nuclear family. Taking into account the arguments that ultimately
succeeded in achieving marriage equality, I will go on to situate these winning logics in
the framework of US counterterror strategies and expose how the state’s production of
good queers worthy of protection is currently being deployed for the purposes of
bolstering support for the War on Terror,12 as evidenced by Donald Trump’s comments at
the Republican National Convention. Ultimately, I aim to highlight the mechanisms by
which the state’s construction of good queers helps legitimize the hyper-surveillance and
sustained targeting of Muslims as a disposable class of “terrorists” in the name of
national security.

II.

The Path to Protection: A Queer’s Journey into the Heart of the
Nation-State

10

Later in this paper I will discuss other ways in which the construction of the “good queer” has
served to marginalize other groups—in addition to Muslims—not traditionally defined by their
sexuality, such as low-income women of color.
11
Lawrence v. Texas. United States Supreme Court. 26 June 2003. Print.
12
Although Trump characterizes the war as against “Radical Islamic Terrorism” instead of as the
“War on Terror” (originally coined by President George W. Bush on September 20, 2001), I
utilize the latter term to emphasize the continuity of the war initiated in 2001 and its targets.
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Although the battle over marriage equality has been a dominant fixture of political
discourse in recent years, it was not until the early 1990s that the same-sex marriage
agenda materialized as a bona fide political campaign. Scholars posit that some members
of the LGBTQ community pursued marriage equality with new fervor as a response to
the AIDS crisis, during which challenges to hospital visitation, surrogate medical
decision-making, and property inheritance exposed the stark injustices many experienced
due to their unmarried status.13 Others suggest that the intensified push for marriage
equality paralleled organized efforts to combat additional problems emerging against the
LGBTQ community, such as President Clinton’s authorization of “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” (1992) and the “Defense of Marriage Act” (1993)14—both of which codified the
illegality of homosexuality in unprecedented ways.15 While some queer folks were for the
first time organizing the fight for same-sex marriage, the legality of queer sexuality was
still unsettled and pending review by the Supreme Court. It was only in 2003 that the
Supreme Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)16 and ruled in favor of petitioners
in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), declaring Texas’ anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional and
effectively legalizing the practice of “private” homosexual sex across the nation. Indeed,
the logics produced by the courts during this period of sodomy decriminalization have
13

Klarman, Michael J. "How Same-sex Marriage Came to Be." Harvard Law Today. N.p., n.d.
Web.
14
Although Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT)—recognizing the inclusion of LGB people in the
military—and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)—defining marriage as between a man and a
woman—differed in their fundamental treatment of queer folks (DADT being understood as an
extension of rights and DOMA as a restriction), both pieces of legislation made queerness
explicitly a legal subject in unprecedented ways in the US.
15
Warner, Michael. The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2003. Print.
16
In Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the Supreme Court held that states were within their rights to
impose bans on sodomy.
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contributed substantially to the contents of the debates over same-sex marriage, as
evidenced by the justices’ written opinions and their explicit references to Bowers and
Lawrence in defending their respective points. As such, it cannot be dismissed that the
rationales supporting the decriminalization of sodomy in 2003 have necessarily informed
the Court’s authorization of same-sex marriage in 2015.

A. The Conservative Slant
The arguments that constitute Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence
expose the logics that have driven mainstream conservative political discourse and its
unapologetic promotion of legal regulation of deviant sexualities. In admonishing the
Court for overturning Bowers, which legitimized a state’s ability to criminalize sodomy,
Scalia writes, “State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only
in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices.”17 Scalia and like-minded
conservative-thinkers subscribe to the notion that the legitimacy of the state’s regulation
of sexuality is located in its ability to distinguish between what is moral and what is
immoral. However, by situating his support for the state’s regulation of sodomy among a
slew of other non-normative sexual behaviors deemed collectively “immoral,” Scalia not
only reaffirms these behaviors’ shared immorality relative to heteronormative18 principles
but also makes available a more fundamental critique of the state’s regulation of sexuality
as it functions in relation to moral judgments—that the state dangerously overextends

17

Lawrence v. Texas. United States Supreme Court. 26 June 2003. Print.
I use “heteronormative” to describe the process by which authoritative heterosexual notions of
proper interpersonal and sexual conduct are standardized and embedded in mainstream social
discourse.
18
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itself into the intimate lives of private individuals when it attempts to referee proper
sexuality in the first place. His dissent thus accurately predicts some of the chief logics
that would drive the Court’s eventual adjudication of same-sex marriage and
simultaneously exposes the state’s long-standing practice of regulating sexuality
according to normative moral judgments.
B. The Liberal Slant
Interestingly the language of morality is entirely abandoned among the
conservative justices’ dissenting opinions in Obergefell. Whereas the substance of their
dissents focuses on the alleged overreach of the courts in creating policy in lieu of
conventional democratic procedures, it is the liberal branch of the Court that embraces
the language of morality and dignity (as made available by conservative dissenters in
Lawrence) in order to fashion its defense of same-sex marriage. While this language
certainly percolates through the entire Obergefell majority opinion, Justice Robert
Kennedy’s conclusion paragraph remains perhaps the single most widely cited segment
among misty-eyed liberals who bask in the language of the Court’s ruling. As such, it
deserves its own focused evaluation. Kennedy famously writes the following:
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love,
fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people become
something greater than once they were. As some of the petitions in these cases
demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death. It would
misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their
plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for
themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of
civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The
Constitution grants them that right.19

19

See Obergefell v. Hodges. 28. United States Supreme Court. 26 June 2015. Print.
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The conclusion paragraph serves as a vehicle through which the court—as an executor of
state power—makes normative a particular set of assumed “shared aspirations” and
disseminates them to the American people, queer and otherwise. Kennedy reiterates the
significance of marriage as an embodiment of our “highest ideals of love, fidelity,
devotion, sacrifice, and family.” This family-centric position is a shared ideal among
liberals and conservatives alike, returning to the long-held reverence for the nuclear
family as a reflection of the nation-state’s most deeply held values.20 Indeed, this
characterization of the family as an embodiment of American values has been
rearticulated by Supreme Court justices countless times with respect to an array of legal
issues extending beyond the scope of marriage and family.21 This veneration of family
saturates Kennedy’s defense of same-sex marriage in Obergefell, which is further
evidenced by his adamant defense of the petitioners on the basis of their deep respect for
the institution of marriage. Kennedy proposes that “it would misunderstand these men
and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage”—a presumable response to
rightwing opponents—and offers “that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they
seek to find its fulfillment for themselves.” The language Kennedy deploys here is
significant in that it reveals two key factors underlying the Court’s decision: the
successful defense of same-sex marriage is located in the liberal justices’ joint
20

Berlant, Lauren Gail. The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and
Citizenship. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1997. Print.
21
See Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), in which the Court found it pertinent to emphasize the
importance of family in relation to a state law prohibiting schools from teaching foreign
languages to students below the eighth grade; In deeming the law unconstitutional,
Justice McReynolds delivers the opinion of the Court, writing, “[The freedoms
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment denote] the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life… to marry, establish a home and
bring up children… and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized by common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Meyer v. Nebraska.
United States Supreme Court. 4 June 1923. Print.
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appreciation for the queer petitioners’ “deep respect for marriage” as well as the justices’
collective disavowal and implicit denunciation of marriage-abstainers. As such, it
becomes clear that the designation of marriage rights to same-sex couples is premised on
queer folks’ assumed respect for the institution and all it implies. Conversely, those who
presumably “disrespect marriage” are relegated to a lesser status.
In the final moments of delivering the majority opinion, Kennedy makes a
remarkable departure from the conventional debate over the right to marriage and its
corresponding benefits. Situated in the haze of Constitutionalized fantasies and romantic
reflections on civil liberties and “the pursuit of happiness,” there is a cagey shift in which
the Court’s rhetoric of marriage rights expands to include a new and ostensibly discrete
“right”: the right to dignity.22 In closing his statements, Kennedy writes, “[The queer
petitioners] ask for equal dignity under the law. The Constitution grants them that right,”
effectively fortifying the inextricable link between marriage and dignity. Delivering
queer folks from a “condemned life of loneliness,” Kennedy offers the gift of marriage as
a path to the acquisition of dignity. Consequently, Kennedy’s defense of same-sex
marriage is intimately tied to assumptions about the dignity that marriage confers upon its
subjects in general, regardless of sexual orientation. As such, the resonations of this
ruling are felt across the general public indiscriminately, including (perhaps
unexpectedly) unmarried individuals belonging to groups whose identities fall outside the

22

According to Neomi Rao, the form of “dignity” that is conferred upon same-sex couples
through marriage is defined by the social and political recognition that the institution
makes available: “dignity does not necessarily turn on tangible rights or freedoms. Strict
equality of legal benefits are viewed as inadequate standing alone, because dignity as
recognition depends essentially on how one’s choices and relationships are viewed by the
broader social and political community, by the attitude expressed about one’s
relationships by the law.” Rao, Neomi. “Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional
Law.” Notre Dame Law Review 86.1 (2011): 183-271. Web.
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conventionally understood category of queer. While purporting to further a new equality
(the equal right to marriage for homosexual and heterosexual couples alike), Obergefell
may also be understood as a legal catalyst for the reinforcement of a deeply entrenched
social inequality with roots well-documented in U.S. history: the inequality of unmarried
folks against the married.23 Although an already well-established pillar of social
convention, the inequality of unmarried folks in relation to their married counterparts
becomes reinvigorated by the Obergefell decision and its explicit assignment of dignity to
those who marry. As such, the results of these judicial logics are far more widespread
than may be immediately apparent.
C. The Injustice of Marriage
Though framed as an extension of rights to queer folks, the Obergefell ruling is
nothing short of a blatant message to the American people as a whole—a message that
indeed carries with it an array of material benefits to those who comply with the Court’s
valuation of marriage and punitive actions against those who deviate. It is a message
whose origins in the US can be traced back to the inception of the nation-state itself, and
it has been reiterated in compliance with evolving socio-political contexts, most of which
have necessarily involved race and debates over extending equal rights to black folks.
During the “slavery era,”24 black folks were forbidden from accessing citizenship and its
material benefits—including the right to enter into contracts such as marriage—on the

23

Murray, Melissa. "Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality." California Law
Review 104.5 (2016): 1207-258. Academic Search Premier. Web. 4 Nov. 2016.
24
The notion that state-sanctioned slavery no longer exists in the US remains contestable in
relation to the prevalent conditions of mass-incarceration and forced labor; however, I refer here
to the colonial period through 1865, marking the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment
effectively abolishing chattel slavery.
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basis of their assumed inequality to whites.25 In the years following the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment and the effective abolition of chattel slavery in 1865, efforts to
preserve the integrity of marriage and white racial purity26 manifested in antimiscegenation laws prohibiting interracial marriage and sex.27 It was only during Loving
v. Virginia (1967) that the Court overturned these anti-miscegenation laws and cemented
marriage as a “fundamental right” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause. Indeed, there are striking parallels to be made in comparing the reverence for
marriage that was used to legitimize the prohibition of interracial marriage through the
1960s and the present-day extension of marriage equality to same-sex couples. In his
defense of Virginia’s anti-miscegenation laws in Loving, Assistant Attorney General R.D.
McIlwaine III presents miscegenation as a threat to marriage—an institution “[having]
more to do with a welfare and civilization of the people than any other institution.”28 He
goes on to characterize interracial spouses as possessing “a rebellious attitude towards
society, self-hatred, neurotic tendencies, immaturity, and other detrimental psychological
factors,” from whom child “victims” and “martyrs” are born.29 Although serving to
further ostensibly different legal goals, McIlwaine’s and Kennedy’s arguments converge
in their adoration and ardent protection of marriage; whereas the passionate and
sentimental defense of marriage in Obergefell is understood to have brought about
See Dred Scott v. Sanford majority opinion: Dred Scott v. Sandford. United States Supreme
Court. 6 Mar. 1857. Print.
26
Cohen, Cathy J. "Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens." GLQ 3 (1997): 437-65. Web.
27
Oh, Reginald. "Interracial Marriage in the Shadows of Jim Crow: Racial Segregation as a
System of Racial and Gender Subordination." U.C. Davis Law Review 39 (2006): n. pag.
Web.
28 "Excerpts from a Transcript of Oral Arguments in Loving v. Virginia (April 10, 1967)." N.p.,
n.d. Web.
29
In his majority opinion in Obergefell, Kennedy invokes a similar child-based justification for
upholding marriage: “Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.”
25
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“justice” for queer folks, that same defense has been a critical element in maintaining the
oppression and subordination of racial minorities—particularly black folks—throughout
US history.
Taking into account the plethora of ways in which this history of the courts’
veneration of marriage has remained intimately intertwined with systemic racial
inequality in the US, the correlation between marriage and injustice must be situated
front-and-center in the context of its extension to same-sex couples. All-too-absent from
the mainstream debate over marriage equality is the leftist position that rejects the
institution altogether precisely because of the injustices it introduces and perpetuates. As
queer theorist Michael Warner keenly points out in his famous anti-marriage manifesto
“Normal and Normaller: Beyond Gay Marriage,” “Squeezing gay couples into the legal
sorting machine will only confirm the relevance of spousal status and leave unmarried
queers looking more deviant before a legal system that can claim broader legitimacy.”30
The impenetrable layer of sentimentalism that blankets the conventional liberal sermon in
favor of same-sex marriage muddies the water for a more pointed interrogation of the
institution of marriage as a whole (including the inherent harms it poses for unmarried
queer and heterosexual folks alike). Pitched as threats to the beloved institution of
marriage, “adulterers, prostitutes, divorcees, the promiscuous, single people, unwed
parents, and those below the age of consent” find themselves the inadvertent adversaries
of the crusade for marriage, according to Cathy J. Cohen. 31 Indeed, so too do
heterosexual women of color on welfare—already deemed sexually immoral and

30

See Warner, Michael. "On Normal and Normaller: Beyond Gay Marriage." The Free
Press (1999): 123-43. Web.
31
See Cohen, Cathy J. "Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer
Politics?" GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies. 01 Jan. 1997. Web.
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unworthy of state support—suffer from the increased scrutiny and marginalization that
accompanies intensified efforts to promote the importance of marriage. As such, the
discourse around marriage equality must not be reduced to romanticized notions of rights
and upward mobility for certain queer folks when such an approach erases the de facto
harms produced by the institution itself: the further marginalization of numerous
racialized and classed groups already relegated to the extreme fringes of the nation-state.

D. Marriage and Nation-Building
By now, the personal benefits afforded to queer folks wielding their marriage
rights (as well as the corresponding problems of the institution altogether) should be well
established. It is important that the Obergefell decision not be interpreted merely as a sort
of rights-allocation to a traditionally marginalized group but as a crucial element in the
furtherance of the United States’ enduring quest for nation-building and nationalism.
Benedict Anderson’s theoretical conception of the nation as “an imagined community”—
whose collective identity and purpose are located in its fantasy of shared values and other
points of alleged mutual identification—stands as a salient approach for understanding
the state’s incentive for granting marriage rights to same-sex couples.32 In The Queen of
America Goes to Washington City, Lauren Berlant situates her analysis of present-day
identity politics around the notion of “citizen trauma” in order to explain the United
States’ investment in revamping its nation-building efforts within the twenty-first
century. Identifying some of the major drivers of widespread national insecurity as of
recent, she writes, “The crisis of national future, stimulated by sexual politics, comes at a
time when America feels unsure about its value on a number of domains: in world
32

See Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1991. Print.
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military politics, in global economics, in ecological practice, and in the claim that the
nation has a commitment to sustaining justice, democracy, and the American Dream
when there seems to be less money and reliable work to go around.”33 In identifying
some of the underlying issues that continue to challenge possibilities for US nationhood,
Berlant highlights the incentives driving the nation-state’s commitment to curing its
suffering sense of self.
Our nation’s leaders naturally emerge as some of our most sacred keepers in
furthering this project to repair the nation. Accordingly, the illusion of absorbing certain
queer folks into the nation-state presents itself as central to the Supreme Court’s
legalization of same-sex marriage. Kennedy’s remarks in Obergefell expose the extent to
which marriage bestows queer subjects access to citizenship34 and national belonging. He
writes the following:
[T]he Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of
the Nation’s social order …When the American retires from the turmoil of public life to
the bosom of the family, he finds in it the image of order and peace… [H]e afterwards
carries [that image] with him into public affairs … For that reason, just as a couple vows
to support each other, so does society pledge to support the couple, offering symbolic
recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union.35

Most noteworthy here is Kennedy’s rumination on the symbiotic relationship between
married couple and nation. His fantasy entails a social order in which spouses support
each other, and in turn the nation offers “symbolic recognition and material benefits to
protect and nourish the union.” Kennedy’s articulation of the linkage of marriage to
33

See Berlant, Lauren. The Queen of America Goes to Washington City Essays on Sex and
Citizenship. Durham: Duke UP, 2012. 18. Print.
34
I refer here to Zareena Grewal’s notion of “social citizenship”—as distinct from “legal
citizenship”—from which certain citizens are granted the social capital that enables them
to participate freely in the imagined nation; see Grewal, Zareena. Islam is a Foreign
Country: American Muslims and the Global Crisis of Authority. New York: New York
UP, 2014. Print.
35
Obergefell v. Hodges. 16. United States Supreme Court. 26 June 2015. Print.
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nation is not without cause; indeed, it is a strategic and authoritative decree effectively
permitting—if not insisting on—the good queer’s entry into the nation-state. Riding on
the coattails of established US ideology that has sought to define the nation by its
commitments and rules to marriage, Obergefell serves as the effective culmination of a
political progression in which the nation-state becomes reimagined as belonging to the
good queer, too. As I display in the sections to follow, the bestowment of dignity and
social citizenship onto the good queer through these judicial proceedings will eventually
lend itself to the rhetorical premises supporting Trump’s warmongering presidential
agenda.

III.

A Queer’s Right to Marriage is the Nation’s Right to War:
Reimagining the Nation’s Role in the War on Terror
“Only weeks ago in Orlando, Florida, 49 wonderful Americans were savagely murdered
by an Islamic terrorist. This time the terrorist targeted the LGBTQ community… As your
president, I will do everything in my power to protect our LGBTQ citizens from the
violence and oppression of a hateful, foreign ideology… And I have to say, as a
Republican, it is so nice to hear you cheering for what I just said.”
—Donald J. Trump, Republican National Convention, July 21, 201636

The concurrent progressions of the crusade for marriage equality and the War on
Terror are not an accident. Indeed, in peculiar ways the two campaigns have functioned
in tandem, with each defining and driving the basis for the other. Following the attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11, the nation found itself extensively
reimagining who it was and the nature of the threats lodged against it.37 Accordingly,
while June 26, 2015 may be understood as the culmination of the good queer’s absorption

Donald J. Trump/G4ViralVideos. “Donald Trump Promises to Protect the LGBTQ
Community.” Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 22 July 2016. Web. 26 September
2016.
37
See Masco, Joseph. The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect from the Cold War to
the War on Terror. Durham: Duke UP, 2014. 15. Print.
36
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into the image of the nation-state,38 we may also view September 11, 2001 as the
commencement of a colossal campaign to define and obliterate public enemy number
one—the bad Muslim, the terrorist.39 Donald Trump’s recent pledge to “protect our
LGBTQ citizens from the violence and oppression of a hateful, foreign ideology”—
Islam, to be explicit—signals a key turning point in the War on Terror and the sociopolitical conditions that sustain it. For the first time in mainstream US politics, we see
bipartisanship around a particular kind of “queer rights”–albeit hawkish by nature and
premised on the eradication of Muslim bodies in “defense” of certain queer ones.
For the remainder of this paper, I argue that the legalization of same-sex marriage
and the continuation of the War on Terror are inherently linked in producing this fairly
new brand of mainstream queer politics. I do so by exposing the particular ways in which
the defensibility of the good queer—as promoted by liberals, Donald Trump, and other
likeminded Republican leaders40—is contingent upon the construction of the bad Muslim
as savage, religiously zealous, morally devoid, sexually deviant and racially other.
Furthermore, I situate this analysis within the broader discourse of “American
exceptionalism”41—a concept that relies heavily on a belief in the United States as

I use “the image of the nation-state” because this paper does not aim to prove the good queer’s
de facto immersion into the nation-state but rather the theoretical and rhetorical elements that
have sought to place the good queer in the imagined conception of the nation-state.
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superior (morally or otherwise) in order to legitimize enduring modes of intervention
throughout the Middle East, be it under the pretense of “humanitarian aid” or flat out war.
By tracing some of the key moments that have defined the nation-state’s investment in
the War on Terror, I aim to reveal the critical role that the fluidity of the US nation-state’s
morality politics has played in maintaining efforts to target Muslims and prolonging what
has already been the most drawn-out war in US history.
E. Defining the Muslim Threat to the Queer and the Nation
The seemingly abrupt arrival of the good queer as a defensible citizen must not
merely be understood as an isolated phenomenon but as part of a larger project to
systemically filter and weed out adversaries of the nation-state. Just as unwed queer
folks, prostitutes, and heterosexual women of color on welfare, for example, emerge all
the more deviant against their newly “legalized” queer-marrying counterparts, so too does
the Muslim body become the object of intensified surveillance, discipline, and
punishment at home and abroad. In Terrorist Assemblages, Jasbir K. Puar coins the term
“homonationalism” to describe the process by which the emergence of a “pro-gay”
national discourse supports the nation-state’s mission to other and target suspect Muslim
bodies; she writes, “For contemporary forms of U.S. nationalism and patriotism, the
production of gay and queer bodies is crucial to the deployment of nationalism, insofar as
these perverse bodies reiterate heterosexuality as the norm but also because certain
domesticated homosexual bodies provide ammunition to reinforce nationalist projects.”42
Indeed, her reference to “certain domesticated homosexual bodies [that] provide
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ammunition to reinforce nationalist projects” concerns those good queers whose
acquiescence to marriage and other expressions of normative sexuality guarantees their
passage into the nation-state, imagined or otherwise. The domestication of the queer thus
becomes crucial to the process by which the nation-state reimagines who it is and,
conversely, who it is not. Accordingly, the good queer is deployed not only as a
mouthpiece for the nation’s principles but also as a weapon43 against the nation’s primary
adversary—the Muslim terrorist—from whom the good queer is definitively
distinguished.
Indeed, the legalization of same-sex marriage throughout the Western world has
proven integral to the production of this queer-versus-Muslim mythology. Referring to
the nature of these ideological forces prior to the Obergefell ruling in 2015, Puar writes
the following:
Gay marriage, ‘less about gay rights and more about codifying European values,’ has
become a steep but necessary insurance premium in Europe, whereby an otherwise
ambivalent if not hostile populace can guarantee that extra bit of security that is bought
by yet another marker in this distance between barbarism and civilization, one that
justifies further targeting of a perversely sexualized and racialized Muslim population
(pedophilic, sexually lascivious, and excessive, yet perversely repressed) who refuse to
properly assimilate, in contrast to the upright homosexuals engaged in sanctioned kinship
norms… Among other groups, OutRage!44 is codifying, for Europeans but also implicitly
for Americans, that Muslims are an especial threat to homosexuals, that Muslim
fundamentalists have deliberately and specifically targeted homosexuals, and that the
parameters of this opposition correlate with those of the war on terror: civilization versus
barbarism.45

Touted as an indicator of the West’s civilizational prowess, the recent emergence of
same-sex marriage proves remarkably convenient as a cogwheel in the West’s ever-
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evolving War-on-Terror story. Interestingly, today’s Republican leaders who promote the
protection of LGBTQ folks against “Islamic terror” also sought to constitutionally ban
same-sex marriage and adoption by same-sex couples not long ago (in 1999, in Paul
Ryan’s case).46 The present-day promotion of queer-defensibility relies heavily on longstanding constructions of the Middle East as breeding-grounds for bloodthirsty zealots
and of Muslims as racialized, sexualized, barbarous subjects. The racialization of
Muslims is aided by a confluence of factors; indeed, numerous physical identifiers—such
as dress, behavior, and phenotypic expressions—become legible to Westerners only
through traditional Orientalist translations47 and present-day efforts to group Muslims
according to essentialized tropes—the infidel savage, slave/captive, terrorist, and
immigrant.48 These hegemonic characterizations of Muslims thus undergird the rhetorical
foundations of the War on Terror and a western investment in promoting its civil
values—including domesticated queerness—against the purported savagery and
intolerance of the Muslim world.
Indeed, the West’s commitment to imagining and developing this queer-versusMuslim discourse may be read as a crucial element in the furtherance of Americanexceptionalism mythologies and parallel calls to war. Describing the fundamentally
ironic conditions of “American exceptionalism,” Jasbir Puar writes, “the United States
creates the impression that empire is beyond the pale of it own morally upright behavior,
such that all violences of the state are seen, in some moral cultural, or political fashion as
anything but the violence of empire. U.S. exceptionalism hangs on a narrative of
Ring, Trudy. "As House Speaker, Paul Ryan Will Be as Antigay as John
Boehner." ADVOCATE. N.p., 20 Oct. 2015. Web.
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transcendence…that posits America as the arbiter of appropriate ethics, human rights,
and democratic behavior while exempting itself without hesitation from such
universalizing mandates.”49 Coincidentally, the ferocity of American-exceptionalism
rhetoric and the nation-state’s aggressive claims to moral superiority enable US
militarism and other intervention methods to deceitfully enact the very “savage”
conditions it allegedly seek to eliminate throughout the Muslim world. As such, the
mainstreaming of homonationalism and particular notions of “queer rights” opportunely
accommodates long-standing narratives of American exceptionalism and corresponding
efforts to monitor, regulate, and enforce bloodshed across the Muslim world under the
guise of moral-politicking.
F. Practicing Exceptionalism in the Middle East
Although fairly recent in the scheme of American exceptionalism, the promotion
of queer-defensibility as a justification for warfare against Muslims is not unprecedented
on the global stage. Dubbed “pinkwashing” by queer and trans activists, efforts by the
Israeli government to brand Israel as “gay friendly”50 in contrast to its “homophobic”
Palestinian neighbors have proven central to Israeli military practices and public
relations. This discourse hinges on furthering the notion of “Israeli exceptionalism” in its
tolerance of homosexuality in order to deflect interrogative arguments concerning
occupation, settler colonialism, and apartheid and to legitimize its brutal military efforts
in the Palestinian territories. Highlighting the methods by which pinkwashing raises
Israel as “civilized” and racializes Palestinians as “barbaric, homophobic, uncivilized,
49
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suicide-bombing fanatics,” Puar writes, “In reproducing orientalist tropes of Palestinian
sexual backwardness, [Israel] also denies the impact of colonial occupation on the
degradation and containment of Palestinian cultural norms and values. Pinkwashing
harnesses global gays as a new source of affiliation, recruiting liberal gays into a dirty
bargaining of their own safety against the oppression of Palestinians, now perforce
rebranded as ‘gay unfriendly.’”51 Although the Israeli nation-state has been advancing
such “pro-gay” messaging for years with the backing of the US, queer-defensibility as a
budding strategy within the US nation-state’s own warmongering platform has curiously
materialized only after the legalization of same-sex marriage. Indeed, this revelation
further evidences the critical role that “legalizing queerness”—with all its respectable
bells and whistles attached—has played in mobilizing emergent nationalist mythologies
towards hawkish recourse globally.
Before the queer defense came into fruition, the enforcement of American
exceptionalism in the Muslim world manifested in efforts to restore “gender equality,”
centering the liberation of Muslim women from the oppression of Muslim men and, for
all intents and purposes, Islam altogether. After President George W. Bush launched the
War on Terror on October 7, 2001, First Lady Laura Bush became the quintessential
spokesperson for promoting the liberation of the Afghan woman under the Taliban.
Indeed, the First Lady (alongside her husband) played a decisive role in explicitly linking
“feminism” to the US military bombardment of Afghanistan, famously pronouncing “the
fight against terrorism [as] also a fight for the rights and dignity of women” in a radio
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address to the nation.52 The Feminist Majority Foundation (FMF)—a nongovernmental
organization committed to “Stopping Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan,”53 among other
issues—echoed the First Lady’s words and promoted the war as a “benevolent” cause
against the gender-segregated conditions in Afghanistan, rallying policymakers and the
American public around the “equitable” principles driving US intervention. The FMF’s
seemingly admirable campaign centered on dislodging the authority of the Taliban,
inserting a democratic government composed of Afghan women, providing emergency
humanitarian assistance, and aiding in the reconstruction of the economy and
infrastructure of Afghanistan.
The American public’s backing of the war in Afghanistan was in large part
supported by this “emancipatory” rhetoric. However women’s studies scholar Ann Russo
interrupts this hegemonic US-savior discourse by highlighting the extent to which these
“humanitarian” objectives served to reinforce notions of US superiority and
“benevolence” in order to rationalize military control and intervention. In her critical
analysis of the Foundation, she writes the following:
The FMF campaign assumes ‘Western’ superiority through its ahistorical and Orientalist
focus on ‘the veil’ and gender segregation as symbolic of women’s oppression and its
implicit assumption that the US embodies gender equality and women’s human rights.
This Orientalist logic constructs an absolute difference between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’/
‘self’ and ‘other’. It does so by erasing the history and politics of Afghanistan and by
projecting a cultural barbarity in need of a civilizing mission. The assumption of
superiority and benevolence is possible because the FMF evades its own implication in
the politics of the region and condones the terms of imperialism – the right to control, the
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right to invade and the right to occupy under the guise of ‘liberating’ women and creating
‘gender equality’ resonant with so-called Western standards.54

Russo’s reflections situate the “equitable” agenda of the Feminist Majority Foundation
and First Lady Laura Bush within the larger Western imperialist and hegemonic
framework. She challenges these efforts to defend US militarization as exercises in
“benevolence,” calling attention to their critical role in reifying Western dominance over
cultural and political autonomies of peoples abroad—particularly those in the
predominantly Muslim and Arab countries of the “Orient.” Accordingly, the “liberation
of the Afghan woman” reveals itself as yet another manufactured alibi in the furtherance
of US geopolitical hegemony.
Indeed, this protectionist discourse reminds us of the substantial role that moralpoliticking has played in activating the massive US war-machine as well as of the
strength with which it resonates today. It is the state’s capacity to project a “moral cause”
onto the conflict that sustains the War on Terror, insofar as the moral politics of the
moment remain relevant to the American public. Since its original launch fifteen years
ago, the story of the War on Terror continues to evolve and re-introduce itself according
to the authoritative forces of contemporary US politics; we have watched its agenda
transform from “protecting the Afghan woman” in 2001 to “protecting the American
queer” in 2016, all the while holding our breath on the defensibility of the war itself.
These changes expose the extent to which the terms of the War on Terror remain
malleable and relevant in accordance with shifting political tones on US soil, enabling the
conflict to persist with indefinite reach.
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IV.

Conclusion: The Stakes of the War on Terror Story
The convergence of the politics of marriage equality and the aging War on Terror

reflects the sheer stamina of contemporary American warfare ideology. The invocation of
queer-defensibility as fodder for the already-immense counterterror state is revealing in
two fundamental ways: on the one hand, it exposes a reimagined nation-state in which
privileged queer folks now find home and security, and on the other, it demonstrates the
tenacity of the War on Terror and its ability to persevere simply by reimagining the
threats that are posed against the nation-state. Between Congress’ declaration of war on
September 14, 200155 and the signing of the Patriot Act into law on October 21, 200156,
the US government became equipped with an unprecedented degree of military and
surveillance authority in the name of national security. Indeed, when President Bush
announced “our War on Terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there; it will not
end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated,”57
he effectively opened the door for a counterterror campaign whose unforeseeably
immense capacities would have surprised perhaps even him. National imagination has
played a key role in defining the parameters of the conflict; as Joseph Masco describes,
“The innovation of the War on Terror is that it formally rejects deterrence, with its focus
on global stability, as an objective in favor of preemption—an unending manipulation of
the future for national advantage.”58 Rooted in the provocation of fear and the boundless
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imagined possibilities of existential threat to the union, the War on Terror prospers in its
ability to morph and seemingly respond to national sentiment, wherever it lands at any
given moment. Whether or not the infrastructures of the War on Terror are actually
activated in the name of protecting queer folks from “Islamic terrorism” is beside the
point. It is of more immediate concern that those innocent Muslim and Arab communities
across the Middle East, South Asia, and the Western world—which since 9/11 have
become the sites of ritualized surveillance, scrutiny, and violence under the pretense of
“national security” and the promotion of “Western” values—become centered in
mainstream conceptions of the War on Terror as well as the rhetorical ploys and moralpoliticking that continue to sustain it.
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